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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-3836 
_____________ 
 
US AIRWAYS, INC., in its capacity as Fiduciary and Plan 
Administrator of the US Airways, Inc. Employee Benefits 
Plan 
 
v. 
 
JAMES E. MCCUTCHEN; ROSEN LOUIK & PERRY, 
P.C., 
Appellants 
 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 2-08-cv-01593) 
District Judge: Honorable David Stewart Cercone 
 
Argued July 11, 2011 
 
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES, and VANASKIE, Circuit 
Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: November 16, 2011) 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 
 After Appellant James McCutchen suffered a serious 
automobile accident, a benefit plan administered by US 
Airways paid $66,866 for his medical expenses.  McCutchen 
then recovered $110,000 from third parties, with the 
assistance of counsel.  Then US Airways, which had not 
sought to enforce its subrogation rights, demanded 
reimbursement of the entire $66,866 it had paid without 
allowance for McCutchen’s legal costs, which had reduced 
his net recovery to less than the amount it demanded.  US 
Airways filed this suit against McCutchen for “appropriate 
equitable relief” pursuant to § 502(a)(3) of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended 
(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B).  The issue before us is 
whether McCutchen may assert certain equitable limitations, 
such as unjust enrichment, on US Airways’ equitable claim.  
We conclude that he may.  We therefore vacate the District 
Court’s order requiring McCutchen to pay US Airways the 
entire $66,866 and remand the case for that Court to fashion 
“appropriate equitable relief.” 
 
I. 
 
This case stems from a tragic car accident in which a 
young driver lost control of her car, crossed the median of the 
road, and struck a car driven by 51-year-old James 
McCutchen.  Then the truck traveling behind McCutchen also 
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slammed into his car.  The accident killed one person and left 
two others with severe brain injuries.  McCutchen himself 
was grievously injured and survived only after emergency 
surgery.  He spent several months in physical therapy and 
ultimately underwent a complete hip replacement.  Since the 
accident, McCutchen, who had a history of back surgeries and 
associated chronic pain, has also become unable to effectively 
treat that pain with medication.  The accident has rendered 
him functionally disabled.  McCutchen’s Health Benefit Plan 
(the “Plan”), administered and self-financed by US Airways, 
paid medical expenses in the amount of $66,866 on his 
behalf. 
 
After the accident, McCutchen, through his attorneys 
at Rosen Louik & Perry, P.C., filed an action against the 
driver of the car that caused the accident.  Because she had 
limited insurance coverage, and because three other people 
were seriously injured or killed, McCutchen settled with the 
other driver for only $10,000.  However, with his lawyers’ 
assistance, he and his wife received another $100,000 in 
underinsured motorist coverage for a total third-party 
recovery of $110,000.  After paying a 40% contingency 
attorneys’ fee and expenses, his net recovery was less than 
$66,000.  US Airways demanded reimbursement for the 
entire $66,866 that it had paid for McCutchen’s medical bills.  
Soon after, Rosen Louik & Perry placed $41,500 in a trust 
account, reasoning that any lien found to be valid would have 
to be reduced by a proportional amount of legal costs.  The 
record on appeal does not establish what amount was 
disbursed to McCutchen. 
 
When McCutchen did not pay, US Airways, in its 
capacity as administrator of the ERISA benefits plan, filed 
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suit in the District Court under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA, seeking 
“appropriate equitable relief” in the form of a constructive 
trust or an equitable lien on the $41,500 held in trust and the 
remaining $25,366 personally from McCutchen.  The 
Summary Plan Description describing the US Airways 
benefits plan covering McCutchen contained the following 
paragraph, entitled “Subrogation and Right of 
Reimbursement”: 
 
The purpose of the Plan is to provide coverage 
for qualified expenses that are not covered by a 
third party.  If the Plan pays benefits for any 
claim you incur as the result of negligence, 
willful misconduct, or other actions of a third 
party, the Plan will be subrogated to all your 
rights of recovery.  You will be required to 
reimburse the Plan for amounts paid for claims 
out of any monies recovered from a third party, 
including, but not limited to, your own 
insurance company as the result of judgment, 
settlement, or otherwise.  In addition you will 
be required to assist the administrator of the 
Plan in enforcing these rights and may not 
negotiate any agreements with a third party that 
would undermine the subrogation rights of the 
Plan. 
 
(App. 117) (emphasis added).  Thus, under the Plan 
Description, a beneficiary is required to reimburse the Plan 
for any amounts it has paid out of any monies the beneficiary 
recovers from a third party. 
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US Airways claims that this language permits it to 
recoup the $66,866 it provided for McCutchen’s medical care 
out of the $110,000 total that he recovered regardless of his 
legal costs.  It argues that “[t]he Plan language specifically 
authorized reimbursement in the amount of benefits paid, out 
of any recovery.”  (Appellee’s Br. at 15-16). 
 
McCutchen says that it would be unfair and 
inequitable to reimburse US Airways in full when he has not 
been fully compensated for his injuries, including pain and 
suffering.  He argues that US Airways, which made no 
contribution to his attorneys’ fees and expenses, would be 
unjustly enriched if it were now permitted to recover from 
him without any allowance for those costs, in essence to reap 
what McCutchen has sown.  Indeed, if legal costs are not 
taken into account, US Airways will effectively be reaching 
into its beneficiary’s pocket, putting him in a worse position 
than if he had not pursued a third-party recovery at all. 
 
Citing the Plan’s use of the language “any monies 
recovered,” as well as our previous decisions, the District 
Court rejected McCutchen’s arguments and granted summary 
judgment to US Airways.  The Court required McCutchen to 
sign over the $41,500 held in trust and to pay $25,366 from 
his own funds.  McCutchen appeals.1
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1).  We have 
jurisdiction over McCutchen’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  “We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
summary judgment ruling.”  Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. 
Pa. Transp. Auth., 635 F.3d 87, 92 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Melrose Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380, 387 (3d Cir. 
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II. 
 
A. 
 
 Congress designed ERISA to protect employee 
pensions and benefits by providing pension insurance, 
enumerating certain specific characteristics of pension and 
benefit plans, and setting forth fiduciary duties for the 
managers of both pension and nonpension plans.  Varity 
Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996).  The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly observed that “ERISA is a 
comprehensive and reticulated statute, the product of a decade 
of congressional study of the Nation’s private employee 
benefit system.”  Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. 
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002) (quoting Mertens v. 
Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Courts have therefore been reluctant to 
tamper with its carefully crafted and detailed enforcement 
scheme.  Id.  Under this scheme, Congress gave plan 
beneficiaries greater rights than plan fiduciaries to enforce the 
terms of a benefit plan.  A beneficiary has a general right of 
action “to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan.”  
Knudson, 534 U.S. at 221 (quoting 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a)(1)(B)).  By contrast, a fiduciary’s right to enforce 
plan terms is governed by ERISA’s § 502(a)(3), which limits 
the available relief to an injunction or “other appropriate 
                                                                                                             
2010)).  “Summary judgment is appropriate only where, 
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving 
party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Id. (quoting Melrose Inc., 613 F.3d at 387)). 
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equitable relief.”  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3); Knudson, 534 U.S. 
at 221; Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 
356, 361 (2006).  It is under this provision that US Airways 
seeks to enforce the Plan’s subrogation and reimbursement 
provision against McCutchen. 
 
 The Supreme Court has explained that the modifier 
“appropriate equitable relief” is not superfluous.  Mertens, 
508 U.S. at 257-58.  Rather, “Congress’s choice to limit the 
relief available under § 502(a)(3) to ‘equitable relief’ requires 
us to recognize the difference between legal and equitable 
forms of restitution.”  Knudson, 534 U.S. at 218.  Thus, the 
Supreme Court has “interpreted the term ‘appropriate 
equitable relief’ in § 502(a)(3) as referring to those categories 
of relief that, traditionally speaking (i.e., prior to the merger 
of law and equity) were typically available in equity.” Cigna 
Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1878 (2011) (quoting 
Sereboff, 534 U.S. at 361) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 The Supreme Court has twice considered what this 
limitation means in the context of a fiduciary’s action for 
reimbursement from a beneficiary under an ERISA plan.  In 
Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, the 
Court first considered whether an ERISA plan administrator’s 
claim for reimbursement was equitable in nature.  See 534 
U.S. at 210-12.  To decide this question, the Court examined 
cases and secondary legal materials to determine whether the 
relief would have been equitable “[i]n the days of the divided 
bench.”  Id. at 212.  As the Court explained, one feature of 
equitable restitution was that it sought to impose a 
constructive trust or equitable lien on “particular funds or 
property in the defendant’s possession.”  Id. at 213.  The 
Court held that this requirement was not met in Knudson 
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because the funds to which the plan claimed an entitlement 
had been placed in a “Special Needs Trust” under California 
law.  Id. at 214. 
 
 In Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., the 
Court again considered an ERISA plan administrator’s claim 
for reimbursement under the terms of the plan and 
§ 502(a)(3).  See 547 U.S. at 359.  This time the plan 
administrator was able to overcome the initial hurdle of 
identifying specific funds within the beneficiary’s possession 
and control.  Id. at 362-63.  Accordingly, the Court proceeded 
to consider whether there was a basis in equity for the 
administrator’s reimbursement claim.  See id. at 363-64.  It 
held that the claim could be based on an equitable lien by 
agreement.  Id. at 364-65 (citing Barnes v. Alexander, 232 
U.S. 117 (1914)).  Such a lien is not subject to the asset 
tracing requirements imposed on liens sought as a matter of 
equitable restitution.  Id. at 365.  Nor is it inherently subject 
to the particular equitable defenses that accompany a 
freestanding action for equitable subrogation, which may only 
be asserted after a victim has been made whole for his 
injuries.  Id. at 368.  Thus, the Court held that the plan 
administrator in Sereboff properly sought “equitable relief” 
under § 502(a)(3).  Id. at 369.  However, it expressly reserved 
decision on whether the term “appropriate,” which modifies 
“equitable relief” in § 502(a)(3), would make equitable 
principles and defenses applicable to a claim under that 
section.  Id. at 368 n.2. 
 
 This case squarely presents the question that Sereboff 
left open: whether § 502(a)(3)’s requirement that equitable 
relief be “appropriate” means that a fiduciary like US 
Airways is limited in its recovery from a beneficiary like 
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McCutchen by the equitable defenses and principles that were 
“typically available in equity.” 
 
B. 
 
 McCutchen argues that the phrase “appropriate 
equitable relief” means more than just that the relief US 
Airways seeks must be of an equitable type; courts must also 
exercise their discretion to limit that relief to what is 
“appropriate” under traditional equitable principles.  In 
particular, he argues that the principle of unjust enrichment 
frames US Airways’ claim.  We agree.2
 
 
 The Supreme Court reasoned in Knudson that 
“‘equitable relief’ must mean something less than all relief.”  
Knudson, 534 U.S. at 209 (quoting Mertens, 508 U.S. at 258 
n.8) (emphasis in original).  Therefore, a fund administrator 
seeking to enforce a plan’s reimbursement provision must 
                                                 
2 Before the District Court, McCutchen also argued for 
application of the “make-whole” doctrine, which is an 
equitable doctrine, applied in many states, that provides that 
“the insured is entitled to be made whole before the insurer 
recovers on its subrogation claim.”  16 Lee R. Russ in 
conjunction with Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance 
§ 223:133 (3d ed. 2011); see, e.g., Swanson v. Hartford Ins. 
Co. of Midwest, 46 P.3d 584, 589 (Mont. 2002) (“[A]n 
insured must be totally reimbursed for all losses as well as 
costs, including attorney fees, involved in recovering those 
losses before the insurer can exercise any right of 
subrogation, regardless of any contract language providing to 
the contrary.”) (internal quotation omitted).  McCutchen does 
not pursue this argument on appeal, and we do not address it. 
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demonstrate that its claim to relief is equitable.  Sereboff, 547 
U.S. at 363.  By the same logic, “appropriate equitable relief” 
must be something less than all equitable relief.  See Mertens, 
508 U.S. at 258 (“We will not read the statute to render the 
modifier superfluous.”).  The word “appropriate” means 
“specially suitable,” “belonging peculiarly [to],” or “attached 
as an accessory possession.”  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 106 (1993).  Remedies that 
peculiarly belong to traditional categories of equitable relief 
would typically have been defeated by equitable principles 
and defenses. 
 
Indeed, it would be strange for Congress to have 
intended that relief under § 502(a)(3) be limited to traditional 
equitable categories, but not limited by other equitable 
doctrines and defenses that were traditionally applicable to 
those categories.  “[S]tatutory reference to [an equitable] 
remedy must, absent other indication, be deemed to contain 
the limitations upon its availability that equity typically 
imposes.”  Knudson, 534 U.S. at 211 n.1 (rejecting the 
argument that a reimbursement claim framed as a claim for 
injunctive relief could proceed under § 502(a)(3) without a 
showing that the relief sought was typically available in 
equity); see also Cigna, 131 S. Ct. at 1880 (“Section 
502(a)(3) invokes the equitable powers of the District 
Court.”).  Accordingly, in light of the foregoing reasoning, 
and in the absence of any indication in the language or 
structure of § 502(a)(3) to the contrary, we find that Congress 
intended to limit the equitable relief available under 
§ 502(a)(3) through the application of equitable defenses and 
principles that were typically available in equity. 
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To determine what types of relief were typically 
available in equity, the Supreme Court endorsed consultation 
of “standard current works such as Dobbs, Palmer, Corbin, 
and the Restatements, which make the answer clear.”  
Knudson, 534 U.S. at 217; see Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 368 
(citing 4 George Palmer, Law of Restitution § 23.18 (1978)).  
We consult the same works to determine whether that 
equitable relief is “appropriate” in light of equitable 
principles and defenses that were typically applied.  These 
sources all support McCutchen’s position that the principle of 
unjust enrichment is broadly applicable to claims for 
equitable relief.  See 1 Dan Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.3(3), 
at 602 (2d ed. 1993) (noting that equitable remedies such as 
constructive trusts and equitable liens are all “invoked for the 
same reason, to prevent unjust enrichment”); 1 Palmer, Law 
of Restitution § 1.1, at 4 (“In equity the principal remedy is 
constructive trust; but equitable lien, subrogation, and 
accounting are techniques frequently used to prevent unjust 
enrichment.”).  This animating principle of equity clearly 
applies to a trustee’s claim for reimbursement from its 
beneficiary.  “Equity courts possessed the power . . . to 
prevent [a] trustee’s unjust enrichment.”  Cigna, 131 S. Ct. at 
1880 (citing Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 95, and 
Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 5, Mar. 2, 2009)); see also 4 
Palmer, Law of Restitution § 23.18 at 472-74 (“[T]he 
principle of unjust enrichment . . . . should serve to limit the 
effectiveness of contract provisions which in terms provide 
for reimbursement out of the insured’s tort recovery without 
regard to whether or the extent to which, that recovery 
includes medical expense.”). 
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C. 
 
 Against this conclusion, US Airways cites to prior 
decisions of this Court in which we declined to fashion a 
federal common law rule limiting an ERISA plan 
administrator’s right to reimbursement under the plan’s terms.  
See Ryan ex rel. Capria-Ryan v. Fed. Express, 78 F.3d 123 
(3d Cir. 1996); Bollman Hat Co. v. Root, 112 F.3d 113 (3d 
Cir. 1997); see also Bill Gray Enterprise v. Gourley, 248 F.3d 
206, 220 n.13 (3d Cir. 2001).  While we recognize that the 
District Court may have considered itself bound by these 
cases, each came before the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Knudson and Sereboff, which clarified the meaning of 
“appropriate equitable relief” in § 502(a)(3), specified its 
central importance to fiduciaries’ reimbursement suits under 
ERISA, and thereby undermined the reasoning and holdings 
of our prior decisions.  Our prior opinions in Ryan, Bollman 
Hat, and Gourley did not consider whether the phrase 
“appropriate equitable relief” in § 502(a)(3) limits a 
fiduciary’s right to relief.  In fact, none of these cases even 
referenced § 502(a)(3).  These cases are therefore inapposite 
in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening decisions.  See In 
re Krebs, 527 F.3d 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2008) (“A panel of this 
Court may reevaluate the holding of a prior panel which 
conflicts with intervening Supreme Court precedent.”); see 
also Gately v. Mass., 2 F.3d 1221, 1226 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(noting that under “[t]he essential principles of stare 
decisis . . . if an issue is not argued, or though argued is 
ignored by the court . . . the decision does not constitute a 
precedent to be followed”).3
                                                 
3 Even under our prior cases, US Airways’ claim to 
reimbursement from McCutchen’s pocket is unprecedented.  
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 US Airways next cites cases from other Courts of 
Appeals, some of which were decided after Sereboff, to 
support its position that equitable doctrines that might limit its 
reimbursement recovery are not applicable under § 502(a)(3).  
See Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. O’Hara, 604 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 
2010); Admin. Comm. of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assoc. Health 
& Welfare Plan v. Shank, 500 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2007); 
Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. 
Ferrer, Poirot & Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2003); 
Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health 
& Welfare Plan v. Varco, 338 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2003).  Like 
our pre-Sereboff decisions, these cases frame the question of 
whether equitable principles limit the scope of an 
administrator’s right to reimbursement as a question of 
whether federal common law can override the express 
language of benefit plans.  See, e.g., O’Hara, 604 F.3d at 
1237 (“Applying federal common law to override the Plan’s 
controlling language, which expressly provides for 
reimbursement regardless of whether [insured] was made 
whole . . . would frustrate, rather than effectuate ERISA’s . . . 
                                                                                                             
We declined to pass on the permissibility of such a claim in 
Bollman Hat, where amicus contended that mechanically 
enforcing a plan’s reimbursement terms “will lead to 
inequitable results where a plan participant’s third party 
recovery is less than the plan’s subrogation claim plus 
attorney’s fees.”  112 F.3d at 117.  Because the participant’s 
third party settlement fully financed his attorney’s fees and 
the reimbursement claim in that case, we declined to address 
“hypothetical scenarios.”  Id.; see also Ryan, 78 F.3d at 124-
25 (noting that plan’s terms limited reimbursement to a 
beneficiary’s net recovery after legal expenses). 
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purpose to protect contractually defined benefits”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); Shank, 500 F.3d at 837 (“We are 
not persuaded that the Committee’s full recovery according to 
the terms of the plan is not ‘appropriate’ relief within the 
meaning of ERISA” because “we generally adopt new rules 
of federal common law only if they are necessary to fill gaps 
left by the express provisions of ERISA and to effectuate the 
purposes of the statute.”); cf. Ryan, 78 F.3d at 127 (refusing 
to recognize a new federal “common law right” under 
ERISA).  Because “[a]mong the primary purposes of ERISA 
is to ensure the integrity of written plans,” these courts 
refused to “apply common law theories to alter the express 
terms of a written plan.”  Shank, 500 F.3d at 838. 
 
 We disagree with those circuits that have held that it 
would be pioneering federal common law to apply equitable 
limitations on an equitable claim.  Congress purposefully 
limited the relief available to fiduciaries under § 503(a)(3) to 
“appropriate equitable relief.”  See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 209.  
While our sister circuits pay homage to this language, they 
appear to reason that its requirement has been met so long as 
the suit can be properly characterized as an equitable action, 
without also asking whether the relief sought in the action is 
“appropriate” under traditional equitable principles and 
doctrines.  But the Supreme Court has rejected a permissive 
reading of this language that would mean “all relief available 
for breach of trust at common law” because “[t]he authority 
of courts to develop a ‘federal common law’ under ERISA is 
not the authority to revise the text of the statute.”  Mertens, 
508 U.S. at 258-59 (citation omitted).  By categorically 
excluding the equitable limitations that § 502(a)(3)’s 
reference to equitable remedies necessarily contains, the 
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Shank and O’Hara courts depart from the text of ERISA.  See 
Knudson, 534 U.S. at 211 n.1. 
 
 Moreover, as the Supreme Court recently 
demonstrated in Cigna, the importance of the written benefit 
plan is not inviolable, but is subject—based upon equitable 
doctrines and principles—to modification and, indeed, even 
equitable reformation under § 502(a)(3).  131 S. Ct. at 1879 
(finding that the District Court’s “reformation of the terms of 
the plan, in order to remedy the false or misleading 
information CIGNA provided . . . . [was within] a traditional 
power of an equity court”).  While the basis for the 
reformation in Cigna was intentional misrepresentations by 
the employer and fiduciary, the broader and more relevant 
point is that when courts were sitting in equity in the days of 
the divided bench (or even when they apply equitable 
principles today) contractual language was not as sacrosanct 
as it is normally considered to be when applying breach of 
contract principles at common law.  We do not suggest that 
US Airways’ conduct was fraudulent or dishonest in the way 
that Cigna’s was, but equitable principles can apply even 
where no one has committed a wrong. 
 
 Thus, we agree that one of Congress’s purposes in 
enacting ERISA was to “ensure the integrity of written, 
bargained-for benefit plans.’” O’Hara, 604 F.3d at 1236.  
But, as demonstrated by the language of § 502(a)(3) and now 
Cigna, Congress expressly tempered that purpose by limiting 
fiduciaries to “appropriate equitable relief,” thus invoking 
principles that it surely knew are sometimes less deferential to 
absolute freedom of contract.  In other words, “vague notions 
of a statute’s ‘basic purpose’ are . . . inadequate to overcome 
the words of its text regarding the specific issue under 
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consideration.”  Knudson, 534 U.S. at 220 (quoting Mertens, 
508 U.S. at 261) (emphasis in original). 
 
 Finally, US Airways raises a practical concern that the 
application of equitable principles will increase plan costs and 
premiums.  This concern does not address the statutory 
language and is, in any event, unsubstantiated by the 
circumstances of this case.  US Airways cannot plausibly 
claim it charged lower premiums because it anticipated a 
windfall. 
 
D. 
 
 Applying the traditional equitable principle of unjust 
enrichment, we conclude that the judgment requiring 
McCutchen to provide full reimbursement to US Airways 
constitutes inappropriate and inequitable relief.  Because the 
amount of the judgment exceeds the net amount of 
McCutchen’s third-party recovery, it leaves him with less 
than full payment for his emergency medical bills, thus 
undermining the entire purpose of the Plan.  At the same time, 
it amounts to a windfall for US Airways, which did not 
exercise its subrogation rights or contribute to the cost of 
obtaining the third-party recovery.  Equity abhors a windfall.  
See Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. S.S. American Lancer, 
870 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 
 Therefore, we will vacate the District Court’s final 
judgment.  We do not decide on appeal what would constitute 
appropriate equitable relief for US Airways because “equity 
calls for full factual findings rather than our speculation.”  
Nat’l City Mortg. Co. v. Stephen, 647 F.3d 78, 87 n.8 (3d Cir. 
2011); see also, e.g., Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 
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(1944) (“The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the 
power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each 
decree to the necessities of the particular case.”); see 
generally Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2563 (2010) 
(discussing the bounded flexibility of courts of equity).  
Instead, we will remand for the District Court to “exercise its 
discretion under § 502(a)(3).”  Cigna, 131 S. Ct. at 1880. 
 
 On remand, the District Court should engage in any 
additional fact-finding it finds necessary.  In addition to the 
considerations discussed above, factors such as the 
distribution of the third-party recovery between McCutchen 
and his attorneys at Rosen Louik & Perry, the nature of their 
agreement, the work performed, and the allocation of costs 
and risks between the parties to this suit may inform the 
Court’s exercise of its discretion to fashion “appropriate 
equitable relief.” 
 
III. 
 
Because we conclude that US Airways’ claim for 
reimbursement under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA is subject to 
equitable limitations, we will vacate the District Court’s final 
judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
